Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, No. 23-50 (Decided June 20, 2024).

Summary

The Supreme Court held that the existence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim relating to another charge that lacks probable cause. Jascha Chiaverini was charged with multiple crimes by Napoleon, Ohio police officers and sued the officers for malicious prosecution after the charges were dismissed. The lower courts ruled in favor of the officers on summary judgment, finding that probable cause for one charge invalidated his malicious prosecution claim related to the other charges. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit’s decision, stating the need to evaluate each charge individually under the Fourth Amendment, rather than dismissing the claim if any charge has probable cause. The majority opinion by Justice Kagan, joined by five other Justices, reinforced the notion that probable cause must be individually assessed for each specific charge in malicious prosecution cases. Dissents by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch argued against the Fourth Amendment basis for malicious prosecution claims, suggesting that other constitutional protections such as the Fourteenth Amendment should apply.

Facts & Procedural History

Chiaverini, a jewelry store owner, was charged by Napoleon, Ohio police officers with three crimes: receiving stolen property, dealing in precious metals without a license (both misdemeanors), and money laundering (a felony). He was arrested and detained for three days before the charges were dropped by county prosecutors. Chiaverini then sued the officers, alleging a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires showing that the charges were brought without probable cause, leading to his unreasonable seizure.

The District Court granted summary judgment for the officers, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that probable cause for one charge negates a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim for other charges, no matter how baseless those claims may be. In other words, because there was probable cause to support at least one charge, then Chiaverini’s malicious prosecution claim based on other charges also fails. This decision broke from three other appellate courts that have held probable cause for one charge does not automatically defeat a malicious prosecution claim for a different charge without probable cause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split.

Supreme Court’s Analysis

Section 1983 allows individuals to seek damages for the deprivation of constitutional rights by state or local officials. Here, Chiaverini’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim was based on an unreasonable seizure due to charges that lacked probable cause. The question before the Supreme Court was whether a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim may succeed when a baseless charge is accompanied by a valid charge.

Under the Fourth Amendment, a pretrial detention must be based on probable cause. Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. 357, 364-69 (2017). If there is no probable cause, then the detention is an unreasonable seizure and violates constitutional rights.  Further, when a detention is justified at the outset, it may become unreasonably prolonged (and thus, unconstitutional) if the reason for it lapses. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U. S. 348, 354–57 (2015). In light of these principles, the Court found that a pretrial detention based on an invalid charge violates the Fourth Amendment, and bringing a valid charge alongside an invalid one does not preclude this.

The Court also found that common-law principles for malicious prosecution suits support the same conclusion: a plaintiff need not show that every charge brought against him lacked probable cause. A plaintiff in such a suit must show that an officer initiated a charge without probable cause, but does not have to show that every charge brought against him lacked an adequate basis. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36, 44 (2022). Rather, probable cause is assessed on a charge-by-charge basis. Thus, one bad charge, even if joined with good ones, was enough to satisfy the malicious prosecution tort’s “without probable cause” element.

Therefore, the Court found that both the Fourth Amendment and common law practice invalidate the Sixth Circuit’s ruling of a categorical bar on Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims if any charge is valid, and instructed that each charge should be evaluated individually. The case was vacated and remanded for the lower court to determine the issue of causation between the invalid charge and the subsequent detention.

Dissenting Opinions

Justices Thomas and Alito dissented, arguing that a malicious prosecution claim cannot be based on the Fourth Amendment and that the Court’s decision creates unnecessary confusion and divergence from established legal principles.

Justice Thomas notes that Chiaverini principally relies on Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), to argue that malicious prosecution is the most analogous tort to a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim. His dissent argues that Thompson was wrongly decided because the core of a Fourth Amendment seizure claim fundamentally differs from that of a malicious prosecution claim. Thomas outlines that a plaintiff must show a lawsuit was instituted without probable cause, with malicious intent, and terminated in acquittal or discharge to establish malicious prosecution. These elements do not align with Fourth Amendment requirements, which focus on the objectivity of an unreasonable seizure, irrespective of prosecutorial motive. A seizure can be unreasonable without leading to prosecution, and an unreasonable seizure does not depend on the seizing official’s motives. Malicious prosecution can occur without any seizure, such as when defendants agree to appear for arraignment and are released on recognizance. Justice Thomas argues the Court improperly conflates two distinct legal frameworks, creating doctrinal confusion and unresolved issues. Justice Thomas also criticizes the Court for relying on its previous decision in Thompson to continue recognizing Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims without adequate justification. He suggests the proper approach is to separate malicious prosecution claims from Fourth Amendment claims and would hold that a malicious prosecution claim cannot be brought under the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Gorsuch’s dissent notes that the purpose of Section 1983 is to protect constitutional rights, not to create new rights. As such, he finds no basis for a “Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution” claim within the text of the Fourth Amendment, which focuses on unreasonable searches and seizures, not on prosecution. Justice Gorsuch argues that the appropriate constitutional home for a malicious prosecution claim is the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees due process in judicial proceedings. Justice Gorsuch also posits that many states, including Ohio, already allow for malicious prosecution claims, making a federal claim under the Fourth Amendment unnecessary.

Potential Impact on Malicious Prosecution Claims in the Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit has largely treated malicious prosecution claims at the federal level as non-cognizable in effect, if not in principle. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2013) (“there is no such thing as a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause.”). This is based on the requirement that the deprivation of liberty required in a malicious prosecution suit must constitute a deprivation “of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996). This harm-focused approach led the Seventh Circuit to focus on the stage of legal proceeding in which the alleged wrong occurred in determining the applicable cause of action, which often involves wrongful search or false arrest allegations in the Fourth Amendment context. Accordingly, the court’s practice has been to dispense with false arrest or wrongful search-based claims brought under the auspices of malicious prosecution because “malicious prosecution provides a remedy for a deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal process, – but when the arrest takes place without a warrant, the plaintiff only becomes subject to legal process afterward, at the time of arraignment.” Serino, 735 F.3d at. at 593-594. This practice applied even in circumstances where a criminal charge was initiated based on wrongful conduct at the investigatory stage, such as a wrongful detention or search because “the wrong is the detention rather than the existence of criminal charges.” Manuel, 903 F.3d at 670. In effect, unless a plaintiff’s federal malicious prosecution claim involved wrongful conduct related to the commencement of legal proceedings, the Seventh Circuit typically dispensed of and/or reconfigured it into a false arrest or wrongful search claim.

In 2022, the Seventh Circuit’s approach was indirectly called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson v. Clark, which held that there is a claim “under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, sometimes referred to as a claim for unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process.” 596 U.S. at 42. The Court reasoned that “the gravamen of the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution, as this court has recognized it, is the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause. And the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause is likewise the gravamen of the tort of malicious prosecution.” Id. at 43. Although the Court did not issue a binding decision on the elements and applicability of the federal cause of action of malicious prosecution, the opinion illustrates an intent to recognize the cause of action at the federal level that goes beyond what the Seventh Circuit has considered.

The Court’s decision in Chiaverini reiterates its recognition of a federal malicious prosecution claim brought under the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court still has not issued a binding decision on the elements and applicability of a federal malicious prosecution claim, it has once again recognized it as a valid claim and analyzed the claim against the backdrop of established Fourth Amendment law. And, as Justice Thomas notes in his dissent, the Court still has not provided any justification for its recognition of such a claim.

Nonetheless, this ruling could cause the Seventh Circuit to reconsider whether a malicious prosecution claim can be properly brought at the federal level. However, even if the Seventh Circuit begins to recognize a “Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim,” the Court’s decision in Chiaverini will not change how the Seventh Circuit analyzes malicious prosecution claims. The Seventh Circuit has already opted for the charge-specific rule when considering state law malicious prosecution claims for which it has supplemental jurisdiction over. For example, in Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that, “because he was prosecuted on multiple charges, the basis for each charge must be examined separately, and if probable cause was lacking as to any charge, the defendants still may be held liable for his prosecution on that unsupported charge.” 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007). This is consistent with the approach taken by the Court in Chiaverini, the only difference being that Chiaverini was considering the claim in the federal, and not state law, context.

Authored by:

not-pictured: Madeline Van Schelven