On September 7, 2020, Raymond Echevarria (“Plaintiff”) filed a five-count Complaint against Officer Darrin Jackson, Sergeant Cynthia Spina, and the Forest Preserve District of Cook County (“Defendants”) asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a Monell claim alleging an unconstitutional policy or custom, and state law claims for intentional infliction of emotion distress (“IIED”) and malicious prosecution. On January 22, 2025, U.S. District Court Judge LaShonda Hunt issued a thorough opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, represented by Klein, Thorpe, & Jenkins, Ltd., on all counts.

Facts Established in the Record.

The case involved a report of indecent public exposure by a male suspect within the Forest Preserve District of Cook County’s (“Forest Preserve”) Busse Woods. Dispatch records established that on September 30, 2019, a person identified as “Camille” (“complainant”) reported that someone had “just now” exposed himself in Busse North by pulling down his pants and that the suspect was a male white in his 30’s-40’s with dark hair, approximately 6 feet tall, driving a gray Honda CRV, and wearing a blue and white striped tank top and gray sweatpants. Officer Jackson testified that he responded to the incident and when he arrived at Busse North a male was standing near the entrance that confirmed he was the complainant. The complainant told Officer Jackson “he’s still back there” and indicated he would sign a complaint. Officer Jackson instructed the complainant to stay there while he went to search for the suspect. He then observed Plaintiff, a 6-foot-tall white male with black hair wearing a blue and pink striped tank top and gray sweatpants, leaving an area of Busse North known for public indecency activity. Officer Jackson instructed Plaintiff to sit on the curb and informed him that he would be getting an ordinance violation for public indecency. Plaintiff also told Officer Jackson that the nearby gray Honda CRV was his. During his deposition, Plaintiff did not dispute that he matched the suspect’s description. However, Plaintiff claimed that he told Officer Jackson he had PTSD and that Officer Jackson was triggering him by not bringing the complainant to him when requested (which Officer Jackson did not do for safety reasons).

Section 3-4-1 of the Forest Preserve’s Code (“District Code”) prescribes that any vehicle used in the commission of any of the qualified violations listed under Section 3-4-2 of the District Code (which includes public indecency) is subject to seizure and impoundment. Section 3-4-1 further provides that the owner of any such vehicle shall be subject to a $500.00 administrative penalty. An officer must have probable cause to believe a vehicle is subject to impoundment under Section 3-4-1, meaning it was used in the commission of a qualified violation, before impounding a vehicle. Officer Jackson contacted his supervisor, Sergeant Spina, and requested to tow Plaintiff’s vehicle under Section 3-4-1 based on Plaintiff matching the eye-witness’s description of the public indecency suspect, the complainant’s indication that he would sign a complaint, and Plaintiff’s use of his vehicle to drive to and around the Forest Preserve. Sergeant Spina approved the tow based on Officer Jackson’s statements, believing that there was probable cause to do so. Officer Jackson subsequently ordered a tow of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Once the tow truck and a second officer arrived on the scene, Officer Jackson went back to get the complainant/witness to sign the complaint. However, unbeknownst to him, the complainant had left the location. Officer Jackson’s subsequent attempts to locate the complainant were unsuccessful, and Plaintiff’s ticket was later dismissed.

Existence of Probable Cause Defeats Unreasonable Seizure and Malicious Prosecution Claims.

Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that Count I (unreasonable seizure of property), Count III (unreasonable seizure of person), and Count V (malicious prosecution) were defeated by the existence of probable cause or arguable probable cause under qualified immunity. Plaintiff countered that the complainant’s call was unreliable due to their anonymity, thereby creating an issue of material fact. The Court ultimately concluded that probable cause existed to detain Plaintiff and impound his vehicle, requiring summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Counts I, III, and V. In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed to Plaintiff’s admission that he was a “near perfect” match of the complainant’s description of the suspect. Although there was a dispute as to the color of the stripes on Plaintiff’s tank top, this did not defeat the existence of probable cause because the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement does not require a perfect match. The Court also pointed to other facts that supported the existence of probable cause, including Plaintiff’s location in an area known as a public indecency hot-spot and Plaintiff’s shaking and sweating when giving Officer Jackson his license. In considering Plaintiff’s argument that the complainant’s statement was unreliable due to their anonymity, the Court noted that “he can hardly be viewed as ‘anonymous.’” The Court recognized that while the witness had only given his first name and was not there when Officer Jackson went back to find him after the detainment and tow, the complainant had identified himself to Officer Jackson when they first spoke and indicated that he would sign the complaint. The Court concluded that the fact that Officer Jackson did not get additional identifying information from the complainant initially because he was in a hurry to find the suspect did not render his statements unreliable or defeat probable cause. Ultimately, at the time Officer Jackson detained Plaintiff and authorized the tow, he had spoken to the complainant who indicated that he would sign the complaint, providing probable cause. The fact that the complainant could not be found later did not retroactively defeat that probable cause.

Officer’s Actions Did Not Rise to “Extremely Outrageous,” Defeating IIED Claim.

Under Count IV of his complaint, Plaintiff asserted that Officer Jackson intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him by calling him a “sicko” and a “pervert” and apparently threatening to send his K-9 dog after him if he ran. In analyzing this claim, the Court recognized that for conduct to give rise to an IIED claim, it must be “extreme and outrageous.” The Court reasoned that while Plaintiff may have been insulted by Officer Jackson’s statements, name calling does not rise to actionable conduct under Illinois law.

Plaintiff Failed to Provide Evidence to Establish the Alleged Constitutional Violations, Defeating his Monell Claim.

Finally, under Count V (the Monell claim), Plaintiff asserted that the Forest Preserve had a widespread custom and practice of towing vehicles of homosexual individuals after issuing tickets for public indecency. The Court interpreted this claim as asserting a custom of interpreting the phrase “in the commission of” within Section 3-4-1 of the District Code too broadly, resulting in unconstitutional vehicle impoundments. The Court began its analysis of Count V by pointing out that, for Plaintiff’s Monell claim to survive summary judgment, there needs to be evidence of a constitutional violation caused by the alleged custom or practice. Based on the Court’s contemporaneous finding that Plaintiff’s constitutional claims were defeated by probable cause, there was no constitutional violation on which his Monell claim could survive. Despite this initial finding, the Court also addressed the lack of evidence to support Plaintiff’s primary claim that the Forest Preserve had a custom or practice that caused any alleged constitutional violation. The Court observed that, for Monell liability based on an unconstitutional policy or custom, there must be some knowledge or awareness on behalf of the municipality of the policy or practice and of the resulting constitutional violations. In rejecting Plaintiff’s claim, the Court recognized that in 2016 the Forest Preserve won summary judgment on an identical Monell claim. Based on this previous ruling, the Court concluded that the Forest Preserve had no reason to believe their practice regarding the interpretation of Section 3-4-1 would have unconstitutional consequences.

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