In a recent 2-1 decision, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Chicago (“City”) and Officers Robert Garduno and Anthony Spicuzza (“Officers”) in a civil rights action brought by arrestee Jevarreo Kelley-Lomax (“Kelley-Lomax”). Jevarreo Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago, et al., 2026 WL 2350245(7th Cir. 2026). The Court affirmed that Kelley-Lomax’s false arrest claim failed as the circumstances surrounding his arrest demonstrated probable cause. Likewise, his malicious prosecution claim was unavailing because, even setting aside the Officers’ disputed statements to the grand jury and trial court, the remaining facts still supported their probable cause to prosecute him.

The opinion distinguishes the standards for probable cause to arrest and probable cause to prosecute a criminal suspect, a showing of which defeats false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, respectively. It explains that probable cause to arrest, where it exists at the time of arrest, is not undone by subsequent developments such as an acquittal at trial or facts surfacing that weaken the case for prosecution.

Factual Background

In February 2019, the Officers responded to a 911 call which reported that a group of African American males were pointing guns at a vehicle at a gas station. The dispatch report stated that “males were standing at pump #6 and pointed two guns at the caller’s vehicle.”

The Officers arrived on scene to observe no one at pump #6. However, they observed four African American males in a blue SUV beside a pump adjacent to pump #6. Kelley-Lomax sat in the front passenger seat and wore a black hooded sweatshirt with a white shirt underneath, distinguishable from the caller’s description of an “African American male wearing a black coat with stripes.”

After detaining and frisking its occupants, the Officers conducted a search of the SUV, finding a loaded handgun under the front passenger seat where Kelley-Lomax had been sitting. He disclosed that he had neither a Firearm Owners’ Identification Card (“FOID”) nor a Concealed Carry License (“CCL”) authorizing him to carry a firearm and was subsequently arrested for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon under Illinois law, which prohibits an unlicensed person from possessing a gun on or about his person or in any vehicle. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1). At some point in this interaction, the Officers learned Kelley-Lomax’s brother was in another car at the gas station and had rented the SUV. Kelley-Lomax’s brother had authorization to carry a firearm. Officer Garduno also radioed dispatch for additional identifying information. Dispatch reconnected with the 911 caller who said the vehicle was “brown or orange” and described one man as wearing “a black puffy coat with like a colored ring around, maybe red or something like that.”

Initially, the Officers were unable to view surveillance footage on scene. They returned on another day and viewed video footage purportedly showing individuals exiting a vehicle with handguns pointed at a passing vehicle.

The factual record later identified inconsistencies between the Officers’ accounts and other prosecutorial evidence as described in the opinion. The Officers’ joint arrest and incident reports stated that the 911 caller provided descriptions of two suspects and that dispatch could not reconnect with the caller during the arrest to obtain additional descriptive details of the suspects. Dispatch did reconnect with the caller, who then described the second suspect. Further, while one Officer’s grand jury testimony confirmed the caller’s account of men pointing handguns at a passing vehicle, the other’s deposition failed to mention any men with guns exiting a vehicle, or any guns at all. An Illinois judge granted Kelley-Lomax a directed verdict at trial, finding that the State had failed to prove he knew the gun was under his seat, a necessary condition for the charge.

Kelley-Lomax then brought a federal civil rights action against the City and the Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights: false arrest premised on the absence of probable cause to seize him at the time of his arrest, and a malicious prosecution, premised on the absence of probable cause to support his continued pretrial detention and prosecution.

The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis

The Court addressed the two Fourth Amendment theories separately because each turned on a distinct probable cause inquiry. For both claims, probable cause provides a complete defense.

A. False Arrest

The Seventh Circuit rejected Kelley-Lomax’s false arrest claim because it rested on the wrong probable-cause standard, treating probable cause to arrest as though it required the same showing as probable cause to prosecute. Probable cause to arrest is based on the facts and circumstances that, at the time of arrest, support an officer’s reasonable belief the person is involved in criminal activity. See Williams v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 749, 756-58, 759-61 (7th Cir. 2013).

Under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, it is illegal for an unlicensed individual to knowingly carry a firearm on or about their person. Kelley-Lomax argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him under that statute because they did not have a reasonable belief he knew the firearm was under his seat. He emphasized that he did not own or operate the SUV, that his brother, who was licensed to carry a gun, had rented the vehicle, that the gun was surrounded by other items, and was not visible until the officers looked under the seat. He also cited case law holding that mere proximity to a firearm is insufficient to support a possession conviction.

Kelley-Lomax’s argument, however, blurred the difference between the evidence needed for probable cause to arrest and the evidence needed to prove the charged offense. The Court emphasized that probable cause to arrest depends on the facts reasonably known to officers at the time of arrest and requires only a reasonable basis to believe that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). It does not require evidence of every element of the crime charged or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Looking at what the Officers knew at the time of arrest, the Court highlighted that

1. the Officers were responding to a report that African American males were waving guns near a gas pump;
2. Kelley-Lomax was observed in a nearby vehicle at the immediately adjacent pump;
3. during the search (which Kelley-Lomax did not challenge), they discovered a gun hidden under the seat where he had been sitting; and
4. Kelley-Lomax admitted he lacked authority to possess a firearm.

On those facts, the Court concluded that the Officers could reasonably believe that he possessed the gun and that he knew it was there, giving them probable cause to arrest him.

The Court acknowledged that the facts Kelley-Lomax relied on may create reasonable doubt to ultimately overcome the criminal charge, while emphasizing that evidence that ultimately falls short of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily defeat probable cause for the initial arrest. Probable cause is evaluated based on the facts and circumstances available to the officers at the time of arrest, and not in hindsight about whether the evidentiary record supports a conviction. Applying that principle, Kelley-Lomax’s acquittal at trial did not retroactively make his arrest unconstitutional. Because the absence of probable cause is essential to a false arrest claim, the Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants.

B. Malicious Prosecution

Kelley-Lomax’s malicious prosecution claim was also defeated by probable cause, with the Court holding that the same facts that justified his arrest also justified his prosecution.

After his arrest, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office approved felony charges, and Kelley-Lomax was indicted by a grand jury. Judicial determinations are presumed valid, and an indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause.  Overcoming this assumption turns on a two-pronged test showing that: (1) the officers knowingly, intentionally or recklessly made false statements or omitted key information to a judge or jury, and (2) probable cause does not survive once those false statements or omissions are removed from the record. Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 742-43 (7^th Cir. 2003).

The Court found the above-stated factual inconsistencies satisfied the first prong and that, at minimum, a jury may find the Officer recklessly made false statements to the judge and grand jury. However, Kelley-Lomax stopped at the first prong because the false statements could have influenced the judge and grand jury. The Court clarified that the second prong is not whether judicial determination could change without the fabricated information, but rather whether probable cause remained once those statements were removed. Summary judgment has been affirmed where the record supports probable cause despite evidence of material fabrication or omission. See Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 744.

Even with the inconsistencies removed, the bare facts still supported probable cause for prosecution. Kelley-Lomax sat in the seat above where the gun was found and admitted to not having a license. The possibility that he rode in a car rented by his brother where he unknowingly sat above a firearm would have been a trial defense, but not a bar to prosecution. In the Court’s view, it did not negate the Officers’ or prosecutors’ initial determinations.

Dissent

In a sole, partial dissent, Judge Lee joined the majority on the false arrest analysis and agreed that a jury could find that one of the Officers recklessly misrepresented facts to the judge and grand jury. She dissented only on the second step of the Beauchamp test: whether probable cause exists after those misrepresentations are removed.

Judge Lee argued that probable cause to prosecute, unlike probable cause to arrest, requires evidence supporting each element of the charge. Here, that would require that Kelley-Lomax knowingly possessed the gun. She stated that once the disputed testimony is removed, the only remaining evidence is that he sat above a hidden gun in a car that he did not own nor was he operating. She found this insufficient under settled Illinois and Seventh Circuit case law holding that mere proximity does not establish possession.

Takeaways

1. Probable cause to arrest and probable cause to prosecute are analytically separate, evaluated at different times, against different standards. The arrest analysis does not require specific evidence for each element, while the prosecution analysis is based on facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe or to entertain a sound suspicion that the accused committed the charged offense.
2. A subsequent acquittal does not retroactively undermine probable cause to arrest. Probable cause is judged on the facts known to the officers at the time of arrest, not on whether the evidence later proved sufficient for a conviction.
3. A finding of fabricated or omitted evidence from initial judicial determination or indictment proceedings may become legally irrelevant if any independent, untainted evidence clears the bar. Even where a triable dispute exists over whether evidence was misrepresented, a defendant may still win at the summary judgment stage if the remainder of the record independently supports probable cause to prosecute.

For questions about civil rights litigation involving law enforcement officers or Fourth Amendment claims against municipalities and their employees, please contact Anthony G. Becknek, Kaylee M. Hartman or another member of Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins’ Municipal Law Practice Group.

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