Taylorville Community School District #3 (“District”) terminated a computer systems administrative assistant.  The school administration was made aware of allegations of sexual harassment by a student. Based on the allegations, school administrators called the assistant into a meeting and terminated him.  The meeting lasted a few minutes.  The assistant denied the allegations in the meeting.  The assistant was an educational support employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).  The CBA provided that “[a]n employee may be disciplined, suspended, and/or discharged for reasonable cause”.   The School District believed the language “may” was permissive, allowing dismissal for reasonable cause (but not requiring it) or allowing for dismissal for reasonable cause,  as an option, but that it did not limit the School District ability to discipline or terminate an employee for other than reasonable cause.  The 7^th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed,  finding that this provision of the CBA could not be properly read as one option for termination among many, but rather restricted any termination to “reasonable cause” and created a protected property interest in employment.  While there is a presumption that employment in Illinois is at-will, and an at-will employee can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all,  once a protected property right in employment is established it cannot be taken away without providing fundamental due process, including notice of the charges against you, the evidence of misconduct and an opportunity to be heard and defend against the charges.  The impromptu meeting held to terminate the assistant here, with no prior or subsequent opportunity for a proper hearing, was found to be a violation of the employee’s constitutional right to due process.

Cheli v. Taylorville Community School Dist., No. 20-2033 (February 3, 2021) C.D. Ill. Reversed and remanded.

A full copy of the decision is available at:  http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2021/D02-03/C:20-2033:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:2655585:S:0

A detailed summary of the decision of the 7^th Circuit Court of Appeals follows.

Cheli v. Taylorville Community School Dist., No. 20-2033 (February 3, 2021) C.D. Ill. Reversed and remanded.

FACTS

Termination Meeting

Taylorville Community School District #3 (“District”) terminated an educational support employee, a computer systems administrative assistant (“JC”).  JC worked in that position for the District for 4 years.   In September 2018, school administrators advised JC they needed to meet with him.  He was given 25 minutes notice of the meeting.  The school administrators pulled JC into a meeting and fired him.  The meeting lasted a few minutes.  He was told he was fired  because a female student alleged JC sexually harassed her three weeks before.  In the meeting, JC denied the allegations.  The school administrators told him the decision was already made.  The decision to terminate JC was formally approved by the Board of Education about a week later.  JC was not notified of this action by Board regarding his employment prior to the Board approving his termination.  Prior to the School Board meeting regarding his termination, JC did not receive any written notice of any charges or evidence against him that would be considered by the Board.   After approving his termination, the Board of Education sent JC a termination notice stating that “[t]he basis or grounds for discharge include incompetence.”   The termination notice also informed JC he could ask for the written report of the school administration setting forth the reasons for his firing.  When he requested the report however, the District did not provide it. 

Collective Bargaining Agreement

The District CBA with the educational support personnel provided, in relevant part regarding termination:

• An employee may be disciplined, suspended, and/or discharged for reasonable cause. Grounds for discharge and/or suspension shall include, but not be limited to, drunkenness or drinking or carrying intoxicating beverages on the job, possession or use of any controlled and/or illegal drug, dishonesty, insubordination, incompetency, or negligence in the performance of duties.
• A conference with the employee shall be held prior to any suspension and/or discharge.
• An employee shall have the right to a representative of his/her choice in any meeting which may result in suspension and/or discharge.
• A written explanation for the suspension and/or discharge shall be given the employee so affected.
• Upon initial employment with Taylorville Community Unit School District #3, non-certified employees will serve a one hundred twenty (120) day probationary period. During the period, the probationary non-certified employee will be an at-will employee. If the employee’s work is deemed unsatisfactory by the Administration and the Board during this period, the Board, at its discretion, may terminate the employment.

School District Policy

The District’s Policy Manual (the “Manual”), referenced the CBA and created additional employee termination policies. It set forth the following provisions regarding “Employment At-Will,”

“Unless otherwise specifically provided, District employment is at-will, meaning that employment may be terminated by the District or employee at any time for any reason, other than a reason prohibited by law, or no reason at all. Nothing in School Board policy is intended or should be construed as altering the employment at-will relationship.  Exceptions to employment at-will may include employees who are employed annually, have an employment contract, or are otherwise granted a legitimate interest in continued employment. The Superintendent is authorized to make exceptions to employing non-licensed employees at-will but shall maintain a record of positions or employees who are not at-will.

Analysis of Court of Appeals

The legal presumption in Illinois is that employment is terminable at will, meaning an employee can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all.   The presumption can be overcome by showing a property interest in employment by agreeing or contracting otherwise.  The Court noted that under Illinois law, a person has a property interest in their employment only where the employee has a legitimate expectation of continued employment based on a legal claim of entitlement.   To establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment, an employee must be able to point to a specific ordinance, state law, contract or other mutual understanding that restricts the authority of the employer to discipline or terminate. 

The question address by the Court was whether the provision of the CBA providing that “an employee may be disciplined, suspended, and/or discharged for reasonable cause” was a mandatory requirement for the School District to follow in order to terminate an employee, or whether it provided for one option, among many, to terminate an employee covered by the CBA.  The District took the position that the language is permissive because while they may terminate “for reasonable cause” they were not required to find “reasonable cause” prior to terminating an employee and that therefore that permissive language in the CBA did not create a property interest in continued employment. [The Federal District Court agreed with the School District position and upheld the District’s termination of JC as lawful.] 

The Court of Appeals concluded however that if, as the District claimed, it needed no reason at all to terminate employees, as is the case for at-will employees, the “reasonable cause” language in the CBA would be mere “surplusage.”  Under Illinois law, [i]n construing contracts to determine their intent, a construction should be adopted, if possible, which ascribes meaning to every clause, phrase and word used; which requires nothing to be rejected as meaningless, or surplusage.   In finding a protected property interest in continued employment under the CBA, the Court of Appeals further reasoned that there would be no purpose served by negotiating a provision into a collective bargaining agreement that  “an employee may be disciplined, suspended, and/or discharged for reasonable cause” since that is authority the District already holds without any bargaining agreement. 

The Court of Appeals also noted that the provisions of the CBA included the following relevant provisions: 

• Examples of “reasonable cause” including “drunkenness or drinking or carrying intoxicating beverages on the job, possession or use of any controlled and/or illegal drug, dishonesty, insubordination, incompetency, or negligence in the performance of duties”.
• A probationary period.
• A mandated meeting procedure prior to termination.  

These provisions further supported the conclusion that the District’s authority to terminate was limited by the need for reasonable cause.  Flowing from the limits placed on defendants’ discretion, JC therefore, had a reasonable expectation in his continued employment and a protectible property interest in his employment.  Under the Constitution, for the District to deprive an employee of such a property interest then, an employee must first be afforded fundamental due process procedures.  The Court concluded that a brief meeting with school officials, following a 25 minute notice, without formal written charges or evidence against JC provided and without a meaningful opportunity to be heard, fell far short of the required elements of due process.

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